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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a generalized C-concave condition, and by using Himmelberg’s
fixed point theorem, to prove a new existence theorem of Nash equilibrium in non-compact generalized
game with C-concavity. As applications, we shall prove a minimax theorem in non-compact settings and
prove a minimax inequality in compact settings.
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1. Introduction
In 1951, Nash established the well-known equilibrium existence theorem for N -person games.
Since then, the classical results of Nash [18], Debreu [2,3] and Nikaido and Isoda [19] have
served as basic references for the existence of Nash equilibrium for non-cooperative games.
Next, in 1977, Friedman [9] established a generalization of the Nash theorem using the quasi-
concavity assumption on every payoff function. In all of them, convexity of strategy spaces,
continuity and concavity/quasi-concavity of the payoff functions were assumed. Till now there
have been a number of generalizations, and also many applications of those theorems have been
found in several areas, e.g., see [1,9] and references therein.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: wkkim@chungbuk.ac.kr (W.K. Kim), khlee@kut.ac.kr (K.H. Lee).0022-247X/$ – see front matter © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jmaa.2006.06.038
W.K. Kim, K.H. Lee / J. Math. Anal. Appl. 328 (2007) 1206–1216 1207Two important concepts for removing the concavity/quasi-concavity assumptions of the pay-
off functions are marked by the seminal papers of Fan [5,6] for 2-person zero-sum games, and
the complete abandonment of concavity in Nishimura and Friedman [20]. In fact, the concept of
concavelike payoffs due to Fan [6] does not require any linear structure on the strategy space.
However, Joó [13] gave a general sum 2-person game where the payoff functions are continu-
ous and concavelike, but the game has no Nash equilibrium. Horváth and Joó [11] also show that
higher smoothness of the payoff functions does not change the situation. In [8], Forgó introduced
the CF-concavity by adding continuity to Fan’s concavelike condition, and prove the existence
of a Nash equilibrium.
In a recent paper [16], the authors introduced the C-concavity which generalizes both con-
cave condition and CF-concavity without assuming the linear structure, and next, they proved an
existence theorem of Nash equilibrium and its applications using the C-concavity. And, more re-
cently, Kim and Kum [15] further generalize the C-convexity using constraint correspondences,
and they prove an equilibrium existence theorem for a compact generalized N -person game.
In this paper, we will introduce a C-concave condition which generalizes both concave con-
dition and CF-concavity without assuming the linear structure. Using this C-concavity and the
partition of unity argument, we shall prove a new existence theorem of Nash equilibrium for
non-compact generalized games. And we shall give a new minimax theorem and a minimax in-
equality as its applications. Those results generalize the existence theorems in [4,8,15,16,18,19]
to non-compact generalized games with C-concavity. Finally we shall give an example of a game
where C-concavity can be applied; but the concavity/quasi-concavity in [9,11–14,17,20] cannot
be applied.
2. Preliminaries
We begin with some notations and definitions. Let A be a subset of a topological space X.
We shall denote by 2A the family of all subsets of A. Let I be a countable index set. For each
i ∈ I , let Xi be a non-empty topological space and denote X :=∏i∈I Xi and Xiˆ :=∏j∈I\{i} Xj .
If x = (x1, . . . , xn, . . .) ∈ X, we shall write xiˆ = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn, . . .) ∈ Xiˆ . If xi ∈ Xi
and x
iˆ
∈ X
iˆ
, we shall use the notation (xi, xiˆ) := (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn, . . .) = x ∈ X.
Denote by [0,1]n the Cartesian product of n unit intervals [0,1] × · · · × [0,1]; and denote the
unit simplex in [0,1]n by Δn, i.e.,
Δn :=
{
(λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ [0,1]n
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
λi = 1
}
.
Throughout this paper, all topological spaces are assumed to be Hausdorff.
Let I = {1, . . . , n, . . .} be a countable set of players. A non-cooperative generalized game
Γ of normal form is an ordered tuple (X1, . . . ,Xn, . . . ;f1, . . . , fn, . . .) where for each player
i ∈ I , the non-empty set Xi is the player’s pure strategy space, and fi :X = ∏i∈I Xi → R is
the player’s payoff function. The set X, joint strategy space, is the Cartesian product of the
individual strategy sets, and an element of Xi is called a strategy of the ith player. A strategy
x¯ = (x¯1, . . . , x¯n, . . .) ∈ X is called a Nash equilibrium for the game Γ if the following system of
inequalities holds: for each i ∈ I,
fi(x¯1, . . . , x¯i , . . . , x¯n, . . .) fi(x¯1, . . . , x¯i−1, xi, x¯i+1, . . . , x¯n, . . .)
for all xi ∈ Xi . When I is an uncountable set of players, we can similarly define the non-
cooperative game Γ of normal form, and in this case, we also call Γ the non-cooperative
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game, i.e., there is no replay communicating between players, and so players act as free agents,
and each player is trying to maximize his/her own payoff according to his/her strategy.
Now we recall some concepts which generalize the concavity. When X and Y are non-empty
arbitrary sets, recall that f :X × Y → R is concavelike on X with respect to Y [6] if for any
x1, x2 ∈ X and λ ∈ [0,1], there exists x0 ∈ X such that
f (x0, y) λf (x1, y) + (1 − λ)f (x2, y) for all y ∈ Y.
Adding the continuity to concavelike functions, Forgó [8] introduced the CF-concavity as fol-
lows: Let X be a non-empty topological space, Y a non-empty arbitrary set. Then f :X×Y →R
is said to be CF-concave on X with respect to Y if there exists a continuous function Ψ :X ×
X ×R→ X such that for any x1, x2 ∈ X and λ ∈ [0,1],
f
(
Ψ (x1, x2, λ), y
)
 λf (x1, y) + (1 − λ)f (x2, y) for all y ∈ Y.
Also note that by using the induction, we can obtain the equivalent formulations to the con-
cavelike and CF-concave conditions in general forms, respectively, e.g., see [16, Lemma 1] and
[8, Lemma 1].
Next, we will introduce a concave condition which generalizes both CF-concavity and con-
cavity as follows:
Definition. Let X be a topological space, Y an arbitrary set and D be a non-empty subset
of X. Then f :X × Y → R is called C-concave on D if for every n  2, whenever n points
x1, . . . , xn ∈ X are arbitrarily given, there exists a continuous function φn :Δn → D such that
f
(
φn(λ1, . . . , λn), y
)
 λ1f (x1, y) + · · · + λnf (xn, y) (1)
for all (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Δn and for all y ∈ Y .
Remarks.
(a) When X = D in Definition, the C-concavity is actually the same as the definition in [16]. In
this case, the concavity clearly implies the C-concavity by letting φn(λ1, . . . , λn) := λ1x1 +
· · · + λnxn for each (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Δn, whenever x1, . . . , xn ∈ X are given.
(b) Note that the continuous function φn need not be defined globally on X × · · · × X︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
×Rn as
in [8], but defined only on Δn in Definition. In fact, for any given n points x1, . . . , xn ∈ X,
by defining
φn(λ1, . . . , λn) := Ψn(x1, . . . , xn;λ1, . . . , λn)
for each (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Δn, we can see that the CF-concavity implies the C-concavity.
(c) If f is C-concave on X, then for any given points x1, x2 ∈ X and for each λ ∈ [0,1], by
defining x0 := φ2(λ,1 −λ), we can see that f is concavelike on X. Therefore, the following
implication diagram holds:
concave ⇒ CF-concave ⇒ C-concave ⇒ concavelike.
To prove the existence theorems in non-compact settings, we shall need the following special
form of Himmelberg’s fixed point theorem:
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D a non-empty compact subset of X, and let f :X → D be a continuous mapping. Then there
exists a point x¯ ∈ D such that f (x¯) = x¯.
3. New existence theorem of Nash equilibrium
Let Γ be a non-cooperative generalized game where I is a countable (possibly uncountable)
set of players and Xi is the player’s pure strategy space. And let the strategy space X :=∏i∈I Xi
be a non-empty subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space.
Now let us define the total sum of payoff functions H :X × X →R ∪ {±∞} associated with
the non-cooperative generalized game Γ as follows:
H(x,y) :=
∑
i∈I
fi(y1, . . . , yi−1, xi, yi+1, . . . , yn, . . .) (2)
for every x = (x1, . . . , xn, . . .), y = (y1, . . . , yn, . . .) ∈ X =∏i∈I Xi .
Then we shall need the following which is a general form of Lemma 3.1 in [19]:
Lemma 2. Let Γ be a non-cooperative generalized game where I is a countable (possibly un-
countable) set of players. If there exists a point x¯ ∈ X for which
H(x¯, x¯)H(x, x¯) for any x ∈ X,
then x¯ is a Nash equilibrium for Γ .
Proof. For each i ∈ I , we take any x = (x¯1, . . . , x¯i−1, xi, x¯i+1, . . .) ∈ X. Then, by substitution,
we can see that
H(x¯, x¯) =
∑
j∈I\{i}
fj (x¯1, . . . , x¯i , . . .) + fi(x¯i , x¯iˆ )
H(x, x¯) =
∑
j∈I\{i}
fj (x¯1, . . . , x¯i , . . .) + fi(xi, x¯iˆ )
for all xi ∈ Xi . Therefore, we have
fi(x¯i , x¯iˆ ) fi(xi, x¯iˆ ) for all xi ∈ Xi;
hence x¯ is a Nash equilibrium for Γ . 
Using the partition of unity argument, we now prove the following existence theorem of Nash
equilibrium in non-compact generalized games:
Theorem 1. Let I be a countable (possibly uncountable) set of index set, and let Γ be a non-
cooperative generalized game satisfying the following conditions:
(i) the strategy space X :=∏i∈I Xi is a paracompact convex subset of a locally convex Haus-
dorff topological vector space and D be a non-empty compact subset of X;
(ii) the function (x, y) 	→ H(x,y) is continuous on X × X;
(iii) the function x 	→ H(x,y) is C-concave on D;
(iv) for each x ∈ D, H(x,x)H(y,x) for all y ∈ X \ D.
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fi(x¯i , x¯iˆ ) fi(xi, x¯iˆ ) for all xi ∈ Xi.
Proof. Suppose the contrary, i.e., assume that Γ has no Nash equilibrium. Then, by Lemma 2,
for all x ∈ X, there exists an y ∈ X such that H(x,x) < H(y, x).
For any z ∈ X, we let
U(z) := {x ∈ X | H(x,x) < H(z, x)}.
Then, since H is continuous, each U(z) is open (possibly empty) in X; and also we have⋃
z∈X U(z) = X. Here, without loss of generality, we may assume that X \ D is non-empty. By
the assumption (iv), for each z ∈ X \ D, we have that U(z) ⊂ X \ D. Since
X =
⋃
z∈X
U(z) =
(⋃
z∈D
U(z)
)
∪
( ⋃
z∈X\D
U(z)
)
,
we obtain that D ⊂ ⋃z∈D U(z). Since D is compact and each U(z) is open, there exists a
finite number of non-empty open sets U(z1), . . . ,U(zn) such that D ⊂ ⋃ni=1 U(zi), where{z1, . . . , zn} ⊂ D. Since X \ D is non-empty, if possible, let zn+1 ∈ X \ D should be chosen
satisfying that zn+1 /∈ U(zi) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. And denote an open set U(zn+1) := X \ D.
Then {U(z1), . . . ,U(zn+1)} is a finite open covering of X. Since X is paracompact, there exists
a partition of unity {α1, . . . , αn+1} subordinate to the open covering {U(z1), . . . ,U(zn+1)}, i.e.,
0 αi(x) 1,
n+1∑
i=1
αi(x) = 1 for all x ∈ X, i = 1, . . . , n + 1;
and if x /∈ U(zj ) for some j, then αj (x) = 0.
For such {z1, . . . , zn+1} ⊂ X, since H is C-concave on D, there exists a continuous mapping
φn+1 :Δn+1 → D satisfying the condition
H
(
φn+1(λ1, . . . , λn+1), x
)
 λ1H(z1, x) + · · · + λn+1H(zn+1, x)
for all (λ1, . . . , λn+1) ∈ Δn+1 and for all x ∈ X.
Next we consider a continuous mapping Ψ :X → D, defined by
Ψ (z) := φn+1
(
α1(z), . . . , αn+1(z)
)
for all z ∈ X.
Since φn+1 and each αi are continuous, Ψ is continuous on X. Moreover, Ψ maps a non-
empty convex set X into a compact subset D in a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector
space. Therefore, by Lemma 1, there exists a fixed point x¯ ∈ D such that Ψ (x¯) = x¯. Since H is
C-concave on D, we have
H
(
Ψ (x¯), x
)
 α1(x¯)H(z1, x) + · · · + αn(x¯)H(zn, x) + αn+1(x¯)H(zn+1, x)
for all x ∈ X; and so by putting x := x¯, we have
H(x¯, x¯) α1(x¯)H(z1, x¯) + · · · + αn(x¯)H(zn, x¯) + αn+1(x¯)H(zn+1, x¯). (3)
However, if x¯ ∈ U(zj ) for some 1  j  n, then H(x¯, x¯) < H(zj , x¯) and αj (x¯) > 0; and if
x¯ /∈ U(zk) for some 1  k  n, αk(x¯) = 0. Also note that since x¯ ∈ D, x¯ /∈ X \ D = U(zn+1);
and so αn+1(x¯) = 0. Therefore, we have
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i=1
αi(x¯)H(zi, x¯) >
n+1∑
i=1
αi(x¯)H(x¯, x¯) = H(x¯, x¯),
which contradicts (3). This completes the proof. 
Remarks.
(1) Theorem 1 generalizes the equilibrium existence theorems due to Nash [18] and Forgó [8]
in the following aspects:
(i) for each i ∈ I , the strategy set Xi need not be compact; but the product space X =∏
i∈I Xi must be a paracompact convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topologi-
cal vector space;
(ii) for each i ∈ I , every payoff function fi need not be concave nor continuous, and H
need not be CF-concave;
(iii) the set I of players need not be finite.
(2) Theorem 1 can be further generalized by using the constraint correspondences Ti as in De-
finition 1 in [15]. Also it should be noted that in our Theorem 1, the set of players I is a
countable (possibly uncountable) set; however, in Theorem 1 in [15], the set of players I is
a finite set.
When the strategy space X = D is compact in Theorem 1, the total sum of payoff functions
H(x,y) must be bounded on X × X. In this case, the coercive condition (iv) is automatically
satisfied, and so we have the following:
Theorem 2. Let I be a countable (possibly uncountable) set of players, and let Γ be a non-
cooperative generalized game satisfying the following:
(i) the strategy space X := ∏i∈I Xi is non-empty compact convex subset of locally convex
Hausdorff topological vector space;
(ii) the function (x, y) 	→ H(x,y) is continuous on X × X;
(iii) the function x 	→ H(x,y) is C-concave on X.
Then Γ has at least one Nash equilibrium.
4. Some applications
As an application of Theorem 1, we shall prove the following minimax theorem in non-
compact settings:
Theorem 3. Let X and Y be non-empty sets such that X × Y is a paracompact convex in a
locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space, D a non-empty compact subset of X, and E
a non-empty compact subset of Y . Assume that
(a) the function f :X × Y →R is continuous on X × Y ;
(b) for each y ∈ Y , the function x 	→ −f (x, y) is C-concave on D;
(c) for each x ∈ X, the function y 	→ f (x, y) is C-concave on E;
(d) for each (x, y) ∈ D × E, f (x, v) − f (u, y) 0 for all (u, v) ∈ X × Y \ D × E.
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sup
y∈Y
inf
x∈Xf (x, y) = infx∈X supy∈Y f (x, y).
Proof. Let f1(x, y) := −f (x, y) and f2(x, y) := f (x, y). In order to apply Theorem 1, we first
note that the mapping H : (X × Y) × (X × Y) →R is given by
H
(
(x1, y1), (x2, y2)
) := f1(x1, y2) + f2(x2, y1) for each (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ X × Y.
Then H is clearly continuous, so it suffices to show that the assumptions (iii) and (iv) of
Theorem 1 are satisfied. Let two points (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ X × Y be given arbitrarily. Then for
{x1, x2}, by the assumption (b), there exists a continuous function φ1 :Δ2 → D such that
f1
(
φ1(λ,1 − λ), v
)
 λf1(x1, v) + (1 − λ)f1(x2, v)
for every λ ∈ [0,1] and every v ∈ Y . Also, for {y1, y2}, by the assumption (c), there exists a
continuous function φ2 :Δ2 → E such that
f2
(
u,φ2(λ,1 − λ)
)
 λf2(u, y1) + (1 − λ)f2(u, y2)
for every λ ∈ [0,1] and every u ∈ X.
Now we define a continuous function Φ2 :Δ2 → D × E by
Φ2(λ,1 − λ) :=
(
φ1(λ,1 − λ),φ2(λ,1 − λ)
)
for every λ ∈ [0,1].
Then it is easy to see that Φ2 is a continuous function on Δ2. Also, for every λ ∈ [0,1], we
have
λH
(
(x1, y1), (u, v)
)+ (1 − λ)H ((x2, y2), (u, v))
= λ(f1(x1, v) + f2(u, y1))+ (1 − λ)(f1(x2, v) + f2(u, y2))
= [λf1(x1, v) + (1 − λ)f1(x2, v)]+ [λf2(u, y1) + (1 − λ)f2(u, y2)]
 f1
(
φ1(λ,1 − λ), v
)+ f2(u,φ2(λ,1 − λ))
= H (Φ2(λ,1 − λ), (u, v)) for all (u, v) ∈ X × Y.
For arbitrarily given n points (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) ∈ X×Y , we can similarly define a continuous
function Φn :Δn → D × E by
Φn(λ1, . . . , λn) :=
(
ψ1(λ1, . . . , λn),ψ2(λ1, . . . , λn)
)
for every (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Δn, where ψ1 :Δ2 → D is a continuous function suitable for f1 with
respect to {x1, . . . , xn}, and ψ2 :Δ2 → E is a continuous function suitable for f2 with respect
to {y1, . . . , yn} in the C-concavity condition. Thus we can also show the condition (1) for the
C-concavity of H ; and hence H is C-concave on D × E. It remains to show that H satis-
fies the coercive condition (iv) in Theorem 1. For each (x, y) ∈ D × E, H((x, y), (x, y)) =
f1(x, y)+f2(x, y) = −f (x, y)+f (x, y) = 0. And for each (x, y) ∈ D×E, H((u, v), (x, y)) =
f1(u, y) + f2(x, v) = f (x, v) − f (u, y). Therefore, by assumption (d), we have that for each
(x, y) ∈ D × E, H((x, y), (x, y))  H((u, v), (x, y)) for all (u, v) ∈ X × Y \ D × E, which
implies the assumption (iv) of Theorem 1.
Therefore, by Theorem 1, there exists a Nash equilibrium (x0, y0) ∈ D × E such that
f1(x0, y0) = sup f1(x, y0) and f2(x0, y0) = sup f2(x0, y).x∈X y∈Y
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−f (x0, y0) = f1(x0, y0) f1(x, y0) = −f (x, y0) for all x ∈ X,
and
f (x0, y0) = f2(x0, y0) f2(x0, y) = f (x0, y) for all y ∈ Y.
Hence
sup
y∈Y
f (x0, y) f (x0, y0) inf
x∈Xf (x, y0),
which implies
inf
x∈X supy∈Y
f (x, y) f (x0, y0) sup
y∈Y
inf
x∈Xf (x, y).
And the reverse inequality
sup
y∈Y
f (x, y) sup
y∈Y
inf
x∈Xf (x, y)
is trivial, and so we obtain the conclusion. 
As another application of Theorem 2, we shall prove the following which is comparable to
the well-known minimax inequality due to Fan [7]:
Theorem 4. Let X be a non-empty compact convex set in a locally convex Hausdorff topological
vector space E and let f :X × X →R be a real-valued function on X × X such that
(a) for each y ∈ X, the function x 	→ f (x, y) is lower semicontinuous on X;
(b) for each x ∈ X, the function y 	→ f (x, y) is C-concave on X.
Then the minimax inequality
min
x∈X supy∈X
f (x, y) sup
x∈X
f (x, x)
holds.
Proof. Let μ := supx∈X f (x, x). Clearly we may assume that μ < ∞. Suppose the contrary, i.e.,
min
x∈X supy∈X
f (x, y) > sup
x∈X
f (x, x) = μ.
Then, for each x ∈ X, there exists y ∈ X such that f (x, y) > μ. For any y ∈ X, we let
U(y) := {x ∈ X | f (x, y) > μ}.
Then, by the assumption (a), each U(y) is (possibly empty) open in X and also we have⋃
y∈X U(y) = X. Since X is compact, there exists a finite number of non-empty open sets
U(y1), . . . ,U(yn) such that
⋃n
i=1 U(yi) = X. Let {αi | i = 1, . . . , n} be the partition of unity
subordinate to the open covering {U(yi) | i = 1, . . . , n} of X, i.e.,
0 αi(x) 1,
n∑
i=1
αi(x) = 1 for all x ∈ X, i = 1, . . . , n;
and if x /∈ U(yj ) for some j, then αj (x) = 0.
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ping φn :Δn → X satisfying the condition
f
(
x,φn(λ1, . . . , λn)
)
 λ1f (x, y1) + · · · + λnf (x, yn)
for all (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Δn and for all x ∈ X.
Now consider a continuous mapping Ψ :X → X, defined by
Ψ (x) := φn
(
α1(x), . . . , αn(x)
)
for all x ∈ X.
Since φn and each αi are continuous, Ψ is continuous on X. Moreover, Ψ maps X, which
is a compact convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space, into itself.
Therefore, by Lemma 1, there exists a fixed point x¯ ∈ X such that Ψ (x¯) = x¯.
On the while, by the C-concavity of f , we have
f
(
x,Ψ (x¯)
)
 α1(x¯)f (x, y1) + · · · + αn(x¯)f (x, yn) for all x ∈ X;
and so we have
f (x¯, x¯)
n∑
i=1
αi(x¯)f (x¯, yi). (4)
However, if x¯ ∈ U(yj ) for some 1 j  n, then we have f (x¯, yj ) > μ and αj (x¯) > 0; and if
x¯ /∈ U(yk) for some 1 k  n, then αk(x¯) = 0. Thus we have
μ = sup
x∈X
f (x, x) f (x¯, x¯)
n∑
i=1
αi(x¯)f (x¯, yi) > μ,
which is a contradiction. This completes the proof. 
As we mentioned before, the generalized game described in [8,19] has an equilibrium if the
payoff function fi satisfies either CF-concavity or concavity. Indeed, many of the assumptions
made in the preceding theorems in [8,19] have been weakened and the existence of equilibrium
has been proved; however, it is hard to improve the equilibrium theorem by relaxing quasi-
concavity assumption of the payoff functions and the convexity assumption on the strategy space.
On the other hand, in this paper, we introduce a meaningful C-concavity, and prove a new Nash
equilibrium existence theorem. Since the Nash equilibrium is an useful tool in many areas of
mathematical economics including oligopoly theory, general equilibrium and social choice the-
ory, the C-concavity should be helpful in developing the theory of Nash equilibrium. Also note
that Theorem 1 can be improved to more general spaces by using Eilenberg–Montgomery’s fixed
point theorem without assuming the linear structure on X.
Finally, we shall give an example where Theorem 1 can be applied but previous results due to
Nash [18], Nikaido and Isoda [19], and Friedman [9] can not be applied.
Example. Let Γ = {X1,X2;f1, f2} be a 2-person game where X1 = (−1,1], X2 = [0,1],
D = [0,1] ⊂ X1, E = [0,1] = X2, and payoff functions be given as follows:
f1(x1, x2) := x21x2 for every (x1, x2) ∈ X = X1 × X2,
f2(y1, y2) := y1√y2 for every (y1, y2) ∈ X = X1 × X2.
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Nikaido and Isoda [19], and Friedman [9] cannot be applied. For this game, the related total sum
of payoff functions H :X × X →R is given by
H
(
(x1, x2), (y1, y2)
)= f1(x1, y2) + f2(y1, x2) = x21y2 + y1√x2,
for every ((x1, x2), (y1, y2)) ∈ X × X. Then H(x,y) is continuous on X × X. For arbitrarily
given two points (x1, x2), (x3, x4) ∈ X, we now define a continuous function φ2 :Δ2 → D × E
by
φ2(λ,1 − λ) :=
(√
λx21 + (1 − λ)x23 ,
[
λ
√
x2 + (1 − λ)√x4
]2) for all λ ∈ [0,1].
Then it is easy to see that φ2 is a continuous function on Δ2. Also, for every λ ∈ [0,1] and
(y1, y2) ∈ X, we have
H
(
φ2(λ,1 − λ), (y1, y2)
)
= H ((√λx21 + (1 − λ)x23 , [λ√x2 + (1 − λ)√x4 ]2), (y1, y2))
= (λx21 + (1 − λ)x23)y2 + (λ√x2 + (1 − λ)√x4 )y1
 λ
(
x21y2 + y1
√
x2
)+ (1 − λ)(x23y2 + y1√x4 )
= λH ((x1, x2), (y1, y2))+ (1 − λ)H ((x3, x4), (y1, y2)).
For arbitrarily given n points (x1, x2), . . . , (z1, z2) ∈ X, we can similarly define a continuous
function φn :Δn → D × E by
φn(λ1, . . . , λn) :=
(√
λ1x12 + · · · + λnz12,
[
λ1
√
x2 + · · · + λn√z2
]2)
for all (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Δn; then we can show the C-concave condition (1); and hence H is
C-concave on D × E. Therefore, we can apply the Theorem 1 to the game Γ ; and clearly, (1,1)
is a Nash equilibrium for Γ . In fact,
1 = f1(1,1) f1(x1,1) = x21 for every x1 ∈ X1,
1 = f2(1,1) f2(1, y2) = √y2 for every y2 ∈ X2.
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